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Survival of Actions:

Adjudication versus Automation
In the Conflict of Laws
Cuoium*

BRAiNER

I
In December, 1949, a collision occurred between two automobiles on U.S. Highway 66 near Flagstaff, Arizona. Jensen, the driver
of the westbound car, was injured, as were his two passengers,
Grant and Manchester. Pullen, the driver of the eastbound car,
received injuries from which he died nineteen days later. All four
men were residents of California. An administrator, McAuliffe,
was appointed for Pullen's estate by a California court. Grant,
Manchester, and Jensen presented claims for damages to the administrator, who rejected them. The three survivors of the accident thereupon filed actions against the administrator, which were
dismissed by the California court on the ground that under the
law of Arizona a plea in abatement must be sustained if a tort
action is not commenced before the death of the tort-feasor. These
dismissals were affirmed by the district court of appeal The Supreme Court of California reversed by a vote of four to three,' Mr.
Justice Traynor writing the opinion. The court said:
When, as in the present case, all the parties were residents of this state,
and the estate of the deceased tort feasor is being administered in this
state, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by
the laws of this state relating to administration of estates. 3

As a matter of first impression, uncontaminated by conflict-oflaws theory, the decision seems hardly controversial. The practical effect was to allow the injured plaintiffs to proceed with their
cases, and to prove, if they could, that the collision was the fault
of Mr. Pullen. Under California law it was not necessary for their
* A.B., Mercer University, 1937; LL.B., Mercer University, 1935; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1941; J.S.D., Columbia University, 1955; Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Fellow, 1957-58, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford,
California.
1. Grant v. McAuliffe, 255 P.2d 819 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1953).
2. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 867, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953).
3. Id. at 867, 264 P.2d at 949.

HeinOnline -- 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 1957-1958

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. io: Page 2o 5

lawyers to hurry to the hospital in order to serve process upon the
unfortunate Mr. Pullen before death came. The case was in a California court; the parties were all residents of California; the estate
of the deceased was being administered in California; the court
applied California law. Why should the law of Arizona be consulted as to this point? The plaintiffs were given their day in
court, as they would have been if the collision had occurred farther
to the west, inside the California border. There seems nothing
very remarkable in that.
Yet there were three dissenting votes, Mr. Justice Schauer writing a strongly phrased dissenting opinion.4 Four law reviews published comments, all to some extent critical.' And there was an
even more interesting reaction.
The note in the U.C.L.A. Law Review came to the attention
of a staff worker for the California Law Revision Commission in
the course of a routine check for developments in California law.
Reporting the critical tenor of the note, the staff worker suggested
that the Commission might adopt as a topic for study the question
whether the rule of the Grant case should be changed or codified
by statute.' In due course, the topic became the fifth of twentythree in the first calendar of topics selected by the Commission for
study.' It was one of the studies in that calendar which the Legislature, by concurrent resolution, authorized the Commission to
pursue.8 A research consultant to the Commission, Professor James
D. Sumner, Jr., of the School of Law of the University of California
at Los Angeles, prepared a study and report which was extremely
critical of the decision.' Although he reported that the decision was
"generally believed to be unsound,"'" he felt that the problem of
survival of causes of action was only one instance of the general
4. Id. at 867, 264 P.2d'at 949.
5. 68 HA~v. L. Rav. 1260 (1955); 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1288 (1954); 27 So. CALIF. I.
REV. 468 (1954); 1 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 380 (1954). There was one sympathetic Article:
Shavelson, Survival of Tort Actions in the Conflict of Laws: A New Direction?, 42 CAM.s.
L. REV. 803 (1954).
6. This information is on file with the California Law Revision Commission, School
of Law, Stanford University, and has been made available through the courtesy of Professor
John R. McDonough, Jr., of Stanford University, the Commission's Executive Secretary.
7. California Law Revision Commission Report, A Study to Determine Whether California Should Continue to Follow the Rule That Survival of Actions Arising Outside California Is Governed by California Law 21 (1955).
8. CAL. STAT. 1955, p. 4207.
9.

CALIFORNIA LAW REvIsIoN

CoMMIssIoN,

R ECOMMENDATION

AND STUDY RELATING

To CnoxcE OF LAw GOVERNING SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS 7 (1957) (hereinafter cited as
RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY). Professor Sumner's article, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HAsTINGs L.J. 128 (1958), is based on his study.

10. Id. at 18.

HeinOnline -- 10 Stan. L. Rev. 206 1957-1958

March 1958 ]

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS

problem of substance and procedure in the conflict of laws, 1 and
that, instead of a statute aimed narrowly at changing the result of
the Grant case, there should be a general statute, "changing the
rule of the Grant case and classifying other matters which present the substance-procedure issue."'" He provided a draft of a
general statute for this purpose 3
The Commission recommended no legislative action. "Because
the result reached in the Grant case is not unjustifiable on its special facts and because the application of the rule adopted by the
Supreme Court in that case to cases involving different facts is not
clear, the Commission believes that legislation on the matter of
what law shall govern survival of actions would be premature and
respectfully recommends that no such action be taken."' " In general, the Commission's recommendation follows the research consultant's report. It differs chiefly in that (i) it omits most of the
critical flavor of the report, and (2) sub silentio, it omits the recommendation that a general statute be enacted, classifying as procedural those things that are procedural, and as substantive those
things that are substantive.
There the matter rests. There it might be allowed to rest, but
for certain troublesome thoughts that linger in its aftermath. To
begin with, the whole episode raises again some fundamental worries about that branch of the law known as conflict of laws, which
can provide the wherewithal to create quite a tempest in a teapot
although, to the uninitiated observer, there appears to be no problem at all. The question in the Grant case can hardly be described
as one of major practical importance. Mr. Justice Traynor said that
the question was "one of first impression in this state."" Having
failed to reach a California appellate court in the first century of
the state's membership in the Union, the question is not likely to
arise with great frequency in the future, since only a diminishing
company stands with Arizona in her position that a cause of action
for personal injuries dies with the tort-feasor."6 An interesting fact
is that none of the published comments criticizes the result in
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 19-20.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 863, 264 P.2d 944, 946 (1953).
16. See PRossER, ToRTs 708 (2d ed. 1955); NEw YoRx LAw REvisiox CommissioN lEPopR 171 (1935); Evans, A ComparativeStudy of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims for
and againstExecutors and Administrators, 29 Mxcs L RFv. 969 (1931); Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions: A Proposalfor CaliforniaLegislation, 37 CA.iF. L. Rav. 63 (1949).
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Grant v. McAulifle; even the severest critic, Mr. Sumner, hints a
somewhat grudging willingness to accept that result on the facts
of the case.' 7 The commentators were worried, not because they
felt that justice was not done as between the plaintiffs and the defendant, but because of the "rule" of the case, and of the methods
employed by the court in reaching its decision. They were worried,
in short, because the decision is unorthodox in terms of current
conflict-of-laws doctrine. A system of law which nurtures such
reactions, inciting the desire to change a just result because of the
apprehended effects of the decision as a precedent and because unorthodoxy is hateful, must be re-examined as often as the occasion
arises.
The Commission is to be congratulated on its decision not to
recommend legislation on the question of what law shall govern
survival of actions. 8 The California Supreme Court is one of several courts in this country which are making serious efforts to
break away from sterile formalism and to develop a rational approach to conflict-of-laws problems. 9 The task is a difficult and
17. 'Turther assume that the parties were residents of the same state, as was true in
Grant v. McAuliffe. Could not the state of residence be reasonably considered the state with
the primary interests and hence the place of the wrong?" REcoMMENDATIoN AND S=ruY 18.
18. It is doubly to be congratulated on its decision not to recommend enactment of
the general statute proposed by the research consultant with the aim of taking away from
the courts the function of characterization. The draft suggested was as follows:
"In conflict of laws cases the following matters shall be treated as remedial:
pleadings, right to jury trial, parties, whether equitable relief is available, joinder of
causes of action, counterclaim and setoff, burden of proof, presumptions, statute of
limitations, admissibility of evidence, revival (if the action survives by the law of the
proper state), and competency of witnesses. However the following shall be deemed
substantive: existence of a cause of action, defenses to a cause of action, damages,
survival (contract survival by the place of execution and tort survival by the place of
the tort), and the effect of contributory negligence."
REcosMaNDA ioN AND STuDY 19-20. A more mischievous piece of legislation in the field
of conflict of laws would be difficult to imagine.
19. "In certain fields, as currently in Conflict of Laws, the wilderness grows wilder,
faster than the axes of discriminating men can keep it under control. The concepts in
the Restatement have been shattered by the devastating attacks of Cook and Lorenzen,
and the compelling logic of the proposition that in the area between the prohibition of
the due process clause and the mandate of the full faith and credit clause, local law is
supreme, has made it necessary to search for acceptable doctrines to govern the making
of exceptions to the local law, and serve as the basis of a new and realistic system of
conflict of laws. The demolition of obsolete theories makes the judge's task harder,
as he works his way out of the wreckage; but it leaves him free to weigh competing
policies without preconceptions that purport to compel the decision, but in fact do
not. He has a better chance to arrive at the least erroneous answer if the scholars have
labored in advance to break ground for new paths. If they have not, he must chop
his own way through, however asymmetrically, and hope that scholars will speed their
reinforcements to the job in hand."
Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 IL. L. FoRum 230, 234.
See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Adv. Cal. 339, 316 P.2d 960 (1957); Emery v. Emery,
45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19
(1955); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); Ehrenzweig,
ParentalImmunity in the Conflict of Laws. Law and Reason Versus The Restatement, 23 U.
Cm. L. REv. 474 (1956).
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complex one; it is not one to be accomplished by easy generalization. The Commission was wise to recognize that the actual result
in the Grant case was justifiable on the facts before the court, that
the decision did not necessarily portend the possibly undesirable
results in other cases apprehended by the critics, and that legislative
intervention would be premature.
I believe not only that the actual result in the Grant case was
"justifiable" on the facts, but also that the approach to conflict-oflaws problems which the California Supreme Court adopted in
that case is sound, constructive, and likely to prove fruitful in the
search for more intelligent ways of handling such problems. Legislation which would have placed this vigorous court in the metaphysical irons forged by Professor Beale' 0 and the American Law
Institute"' would have been reactionary in the extreme. At the
same time, it must be conceded that the opinion in the Grant case
is not one which gives clear guidance as to the future course of
development of conflict of laws in California concerning survival
of actions. The reason for that is understandable. Confronted with
a situation in which the result dictated by the orthodox system of
conflict of laws was manifestly absurd, and in which the just and
rational result was dear, the court availed itself of one of the several escape devices which are built into the system itself. It characterized the problem differently, and the different characterization
produced the result which had previously been recognized as the
sound one. This is a device which has long been used by the
courts2 It is far from an ideal way of dealing with such situations.
Certainly it would be better if the courts could state explicitly the
considerations which led them in the first place to determine what
the result should be, and indicate dearly how those considerations
will be appraised in other cases. Legal scholars, however, have not
provided the courts with a systematic method of analysis whereby
the sound instincts employed by a sensitive court in the adjudication of conflict-of-laws cases can be fitted into the conventions and
the terminology of the legal order. 3 They have provided only a
mechanism for dealing with such cases which leaves no room for
20. BEALE, Tim CoNpIcr or LAws (1935).
21. REsrATEmENT, CoNfiCr op LAws (1934).

22. See Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Adi. 163, 61
A.L.R. 846 (1928); Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871); Shavelson, Survival of Tort
Actions in the Conflict of Laws: A New Direction?, 42 Cxa.r. L. Rwv. 803, 809 n.22
(1954); Yntema, The Objectives of Private InternationalLaw, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721, 727
(1957).
23. See Traynor, supra note 19.
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such an adjudicative function, and which is continually confronting the courts with the choice between a mechanistic result which
is repugnant and an acceptable result which can be reached only
by a none-too-candid resort to one or another of the loopholes in the
system. Scholars have talked of a better approach, whereby the
courts would seek to apply "the more effective and more useful
law,"' or the law that fulfills "the demands of justice in the particular situation,"" or the law which produces results which are
acceptable "from the standpoint of justice between the litigating
individuals or of those broader considerations of social policy
which conflicting laws may evoke . . . ." They have not, however, suggested any method whereby the courts could select the
appropriate law objectively; and, in the present state of development of this approach, an attempt by the court to explain its decision in such terms would doubtless create more uncertainty and
arouse more criticism than did the California Supreme Court's
employment of the traditional escape device of novel characteriza27

tion.

The decision in the Grant case is consistent with a method of
analysis which I think holds promise of considerable utility in the
intelligent and objective adjudication of conflict-of-laws cases. I
do not suggest that the California court consciously employed any
such analysis. I suggest that the result which that court recognized
on common-sense grounds as the sound one, and then justified by
a traditionally authorized manipulation of the concepts of the system, can be explained and justified by objective analysis.
II
The art of reading cases and of evaluating them as precedents
remains an art, no matter how hard we law teachers try to make
a science of it. After all, the purpose of the process is to provide a
24. Aldricus (c. 1200), as paraphrased by Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 As. J. Comp. L. 297, 301-2 (1953), reprinted in AssoCIA IoN oF
A ERICAN LAW SCHoOLs, SEs.Ecmo R.ADINGS ON CoNm'ucr op LAws 30, 34 (1956). Hereinafter, the Association's collection will be cited "AA.L.S. REAINGS."
25. Lorenzen, Territoriality,PublicPolicy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736,
748 (1924).
26. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Hzv. L. REv. 173, 192
(1933), A.A.L.S. READIrNs 101, 114.
27. On the other hand, the critical reaction might have been less severe than it was if
the court had used an even more respectable escape device and refused to apply the "applicable" foreign law on the ground that it was contrary to the public policy of the forum.
See Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918); Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy"
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLum. L. REv. 969 (1956).
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basis for predicting future decisions, and for that practical purpose
it is often necessary to read between the lines of the opinion as well
as to apply the canons formulated by Goodhart and others" for
the guidance of law students. A case may mean more than it seems
to hold, or it may mean less." For the purposes of our discussion,
it is important to know just what the court held in the Grant case.
That question had an important bearing on the reaction of the
critics, and is central to our analysis.
To me it seems dear enough that one, and only one, prediction
can be made with certainty on the basis of the Grant decision: the
California law providing for survival, and not the law of the place
of injury providing for abatement, will be applied when the following conditions are satisfied:
i. The injured person was a resident of California at the time
of the injury;
2. The tort-feasor was a resident of California at the time of the
injury;
3. The estate of the deceased tort-feasor is being administered
in California; and
4. The action is brought in California.
Such an evaluation of the decision as a precedent accords with
a strict and salutary conception of the doctrine of stare decisis. ° It
accords with the restrained interpretation placed on the decision by
the Law Revision Commission, which recognized that the implications for cases in which the facts are different are by no means
obvious. 2" The critics of the decision, however, are not content with
such a restrained interpretation. They must stretch the actual decision into a rule which will cover more cases than the one before
the court, say more than the court decided. The passion for such
rules is particularly strong in the field of conflict of laws. Nothing
narrower in scope than a typical rule of the Restatement will satisfy
the critics. The court has rejected section 390 of the Restatement:
"Whether a claim for damages for a tort survives the death of the
28. Goodhart, Determiningthe Ratio Deddendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930);
see also Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243
(1938).
29. See Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
30. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Dedsis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928); Cavers, op. it. supra
note 26, at 196 n.40; A.A.L.S. READINGs at 116 n.40.
31. IEcomsNDAnwoN im STUDY 6.
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tort-feasor or of the injured person is determined by the law of
the place of wrong." 2 Well, then, say the critics, let the court
substitute another rule, of equal generality, in place of the rejected rule. The court may not have wished to commit itself to
generalities beyond the necessities of the case to be decided. No
matter; the critics must, by main force if necessary, interpret the
decision as establishing a rule of traditional generality, and attribute that rule to the court.
Force was not necessary in the Grant case. The opinion of the
court undeniably lent encouragement to the scramble to find the
premises from which the conclusion followed. The court provided
alternative premises, both leading to the same result: (i) the question of survival is a question of procedure, and (2) the question is
one concerning the administration of decedents' estates. On either
premise, the law of the forum controls. Only after suggesting that
the result might be justified by one or both of these premises did
the court limit the holding to the facts of the case in hand, thus
serving notice, I think, that neither premise was to be employed to
produce absurd results in other cases.
The critics were little deterred by this notice. From the beginning, they presumed to extract and state the "rule." The staff
worker who brought the question to the attention of the Commission said in his report that the holding was that the question "is a
matter of procedure and therefore governed by the law of California.""3 In submitting the proposed study for approval as a Commission project, the Commission referred to "the rule that survival
of causes of action arising elsewhere is governed by California
law when suit is brought in this state .

. . .""

According to one

law review comment, the holding was "that survival of actions is a
matter of procedural law and governed by the lex fori."35 Another
was less specific: "The survival of a tort action for personal injuries
is determined by the law of the forum."36 A third criticized the procedural classification but approved the alternative relating to administration of estates. Mr. Sumner noted carefully the three
32. REsTATEmENT, CoNFLiCr oF LAws § 390 (1934).

33. See note 6 supra.
34. R commanDrsON AND STUDY 5.
35. 1 U.C.L.A.L. RPv. 380, 381 (1954). The Comment does not refer to the alternative characterization of the problem as one relating to administration of estates. It does
mention the court's suggestion that the decision was limited to the facts of the case.
36. 29 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1288 (1954). Mention is made of the alternative theories.
37. 27 So. CAL F. L. Rav. 468 (1954).
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possible delimitations of the scope of the decision." Most of his
discussion, however, was devoted to the classification of the question as procedural. He thought the proposition that the question
should be characterized as one concerning administration of estates
was "arguable," but dismissed it rather summarily: "However,
there is but slight authority to support this intimation. ... It is
inescapable that the basic problem is one of tort recovery.""n At
one point he says flatly: "The decision in the [Grant] . . . case

was based on survival being classified as a matter of procedurewhich is definitely against the overwhelming weight of authority
in the United States.""0 In a section on "Constitutional Issues,"
which will warrant some consideration at a later point, he says in
effect that the court's classification of the problem is "outrageous."''
His opinion that the decision is unconstitutionalas a violation of
the due process clause "can be based on the conclusion that the
characterization was erroneous or that the choice of law was improper.... However, when the need for uniformity of result is
considered, the undesirability of the Grantdecision becomes more
apparent." ' The indictment concludes: "Therefore, the only conclusion to be reached respecting the Grant case is that an erroneous
determination was made or that the court was greatly influenced
by the 'sympathy' factors in the case. Moreover, as has been
demonstrated, the decision in Grant v. McAuliffe was the result
of the court's failure to analyze properly the cases upon which
it relied."4 3
It is by thought processes such as these that a decision which
seemed at first noncontroversial, natural, justifiable, and even desirable in result comes to be spoken of as undesirable, erroneous,
38. REcoemsaEsDATioN

NDr SrtUY 8.

39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 14. In connection with this matter of the weight of authority, Mr. Sumner
says: "Therefore the California court's statement that a majority treat survival as a procedural point is erroneous." Id. at 12. He does not append a citation, and I do not find
such a statement in the opinion of the court. On the contrary, I find these statements:
"The precedents in other jurisdictons are conflicting. In many cases it has been held
that the survival of a cause of action is a matter of substance and that the law of
the place where the tortious acts occurred must be applied to determine the question.
. . . Before that time [1929], it appears that the weight of authority was that survival of causes of action is procedural and governed by the domestic law of the
forum."
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 863, 264 P.2d 944, 946-47 (1953). "Since we find
no compelling weight of authority for either alternative, we are free to make a choice on
the merits." Id. at 866, 264 P.2d at 949.
41. REcOmrENDATroN AND Sr=Y 9.
42. Ibid.
43. Id. at 14.
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and even outrageous and unconstitutional." It is worth remembering that no one has criticized the justice of the result in the case
which the court decided. Nor do I find any solid indications that
Mr. Sumner is particularly concerned because of the possibility
that one or the other of the alternative premises for the decision
might work an undesirable result if applied to other fact situations
-a concern provisionally expressed by the Commission in its recommendation.45 Nevertheless, the decision, according to Mr. Sumner, is wrong, and the court ought to be prevented from reaching
such satisfactory results in future cases-by legislation which will,
at the same time, deny the court any such freedom in a wide variety
of other cases.
If I were called upon to explain such vagaries of the legal mind
to a layman, I think I would try to do so in this way:46 Conflict-oflaws cases-i.e., cases in which two or more states are involved in
potentially significant ways-confront the courts with a uniquely
difficult set of problems. The problems are complex and sensitive.
Frequently, nothing less is involved than a determination that the
legitimate law and policy of one sovereign state must yield to that
of another. Some of our greatest judges have recoiled from conflict
' The
of laws as "one of the most bafling subjects of legal science."47
problems are at least as difficult as those in any other branch of the
law, since almost any problem, from almost any branch of the law,
may be presented-with an additional dimension because of the
involvement of more than one state. Once we move outside the
range of a single legal system, it is difficult for us to find any ultimate goal to pursue in the adjudication of controversies, such as we
have under a single system in the ideal of justice under law; for
with two or more systems of law involved, an ambiguity is introduced: Justice under what law? The nearest thing to an ultimate
goal that we have been able to agree upon is the ideal of uniformity
-in general, at least, it will be desirable if the outcome of a case
does not depend on where the action is brought.
But questions of such intricacy and difficulty and delicacy must
44. I have not, of course, outlined Mr. Sumner's argument in detail. In the main,
it is devoted to showing that the decision is contrary to the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, and to what most of the courts have said. So much may be conceded. The decision
is certainly an unorthodox one. For an analysis of the precedents, see Appendix, p. 249
infra.
45. RECOMMENDATION AND Stmvy 5-6.
46. The figure is doubtless overdrawn. I have long believed, however, that anamorphosis is as legitimate a technique in argumentation as it is in the graphic arts.
47. E.g., C., nozo, THE PARAXoxEs oF LEGAL Scsamcn 67 (1928).
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not be left to be determined by the judges. We must have a government of laws (don't ask what laws) and not of men. We must
not place it within the power of judges to determine that the law
and policy of a sovereign state shall yield to that of another. Therefore, we have constructed a machine for the solution of such problems. No other goal being apparent, we have, in the construction
of the machine, given uniformity of result primacy over all other
considerations. To this end, we have adjusted the machine so that,
for any imaginable case, one and only one state can be identified
whose law should be applied by all states. When a conflict-of-laws
case comes before a court, the court is not supposed to adjudicate
it-that is, to bring its intelligence to bear upon the reason and
policy and history of the laws in question, and their application to
the facts at hand so as to do justice to the parties under law. He is
supposed to feed the data into the machine, using certain standard
procedures, and to write down as his decision the result that comes
out of the machine. He is not supposed to question the wisdom,
or soundness, or justice of the result, nor to think, or even talk, in
terms of competing policies.
Now, what happened in the Grant case is pretty clear. The
judges fed the data into the machine in the usual way, but, when
the machine's answer came out, they couldn't swallow it. They
rebelled against the machine. They adjudicatedthe case. Using
discretion and intelligence, and having regard to the fact that it
was a lawsuit they were trying, they looked for a result they could
live with. They saw no purpose, in reason or policy, to be served
by applying Arizona law to cut off the rights of the plaintiffs when
the tort-feasor died-at least, no purpose which seemed important
in comparison with their obligation to decide the controversy between the parties properly. So they decided the case their way.
This was a kind of insubordination on their part, of course; acting
that way, they might open a whole Pandora's box of troublesome
problems which the law has stowed safely away, out of sight where
they will not cause us any trouble. Doubtless they felt a bit uncomfortable, as anyone might who has departed from the ordained
path. So they went back to the machine and fed the same data
into it again, this time using a somewhat different procedure. After
pressing the button marked "Procedure is governed by the law of
the forum, substance by the law of the place of the wrong," they
pressed the button marked "Procedural" instead of the one marked
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"Substantive." This time the machine came up with the answer
that the court had arrived at independently. Again the court fed
the data into the machine, this time pressing instead a button referring to administration of decedents' estates. Again the machine
came forth with the judges' own answer. They were able, then, to
hand down their own decision, and to show that the same result
would be yielded by the machine, given two procedures different
from the one which first suggested itself.
Mr. Sumner is dismayed by this exposure of the fallibility of
the machine. Quite accurately, he has placed his finger on the
trouble: there is too little control of the operating procedures."'
Judges have too much freedom to decide what the problem is.
Consequently, the machine can be made to give not just one result
but different results. This will never do. The machine must be
tightened up; the process must be made fully automatic. The
judges must not only be required to accept the machine's solution
of the problem; they must be told how to state the problem to the
machine as well. Only in this way can judicial discretion and intelligence be excluded. Otherwise the single goal of uniformity is
jeopardized; otherwise we are threatened with adjudication instead
of automation in conflicts cases.
Mr. Sumner has nothing against intelligence, of course. He
simply believes that the final contribution of human intelligence
to the solution of conflict-of-laws problems was made when the
machine was built. A result which differs from that which the
machine will produce under conventional operating procedures
must be the product of either error or prejudice. "[T]he only conclusion to be reached respecting the Grant case is that an erroneous determination was made or that the court was greatly influenced by the 'sympathy' factors in the case."4 Since Mr. Sumner
makes it pretty clear that he thinks the court knew the proper operating procedures, and manipulated the machine deliberately to
produce the desired result, one may fairly gather that he believes
the decision was based on purely subjective grounds: sentimental
48. '"Moreover, conflicts cases involve very flexible facts. Alternative courses are presented in every step. It is for this reason that there is almost a dearth of legislation in
the field. If legislation were enacted providing that survival of a tort action is to be
controlled by the place of the wrong, this would still leave considerable discretion in
the court. Where is the place of the wrong?"
REcomME NDATioN AND S'uY 18.
49. RaEcomENDAToN AND STreY 14.
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bias in favor of the plaintiffs and unbecoming hostility to the archaism of the Arizona law.
In all this I think Mr. Sumner is quite wrong. "
III
A California statute, enacted in 1949, provides: "A thing in
action arising out of a wrong which results in physical injury to the
person ... shall not abate by reason of the death of the wrongdoer . . . ."" This statutory provision was designed to change
the common-law rule of abatement, which had prevailed in Cali-

fornia for a century.52 Presumably the change was made for a
reason. The California Legislature adopted a new policy, and
gave expression to it in this form. What was that policy, and how
should the statute be applied to cases involving foreign factors so
as to effectuate it?
50. The objection made in the dissenting opinion was on a much narrower ground.
Mr. Justice Schauer was troubled only by the fact that the characterization of survival as
a procedural matter seemed inconsistent with the court's previous decision in Cort v.
Steen, 36 Cal.2d 437, 224 P.2d 723 (1950), holding the survival statute "substantive" for
the purpose of determining whether it should be given retrospective effect. That there was
no such inconsistency is made clear by Walter Wheeler Cook's brilliant essay on "Substance" and "Procedure." Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws,
42 YA. L.J. 333 (1933), A.A.L.S. R1AwINas 499, relied on by the majority. The minority
made no reference to Cook's analysis. Only one of the law review comments supported the
majority in its position on the alleged inconsistency, 27 So. CAL F. L. Rav. 468, 469 (1954),
though Mr. Sumner did. RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY 11 n.24. It is a matter for profound regret when one of the finer products of legal scholarship is neither refuted nor accepted, but ignored. See also Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21
U. Cm. L. Rav. 620, 621 (1954). If Professor Cook's argument does not produce conviction,
no additional argument is likely to do so. It may, however, be worthwhile to add that
counsel once attempted to trap Mr. Justice Holmes in the false dilemma which troubled
the dissenting justices, and ran into a stone wall of common sense. Holmes held that a
foreign statute of limitations was to be treated as substantive and applied by the forum
because it was directed to the statutory liability so specifically that it qualified the right.
Counsel submitted that from this it followed that the limitation could not be applied in
the case at bar, since the cause of action had arisen prior to the amendment changing the
limitation period, and substantive laws could not be retrospectively applied. Holmes was
merely impatient. He avoided the trap by not using the terms "substance" and "procedure"
in discussing the constitutional point. As to that he said, shortly and appositely: "[The
operation of the statute in this instance] did not shorten liability unreasonably." Davis v.
Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 456 (1904).
51. CAL. Crv. CODE § 956 (1954). Similar provisions are contained in CAL. CoDE
Cxv. PRoc. § 385 (1954), and CAL. PRoB. CODE §§ 573, 574 (1956). Thus, for purposes
of codification, the problem has been "characterized" as substantive, as procedural, and as
a matter pertaining to the administration of decedents' estates.
52. See Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions: A Proposal for California Legislation,
37 CALr'. L. REv. 63 (1949). Actually, the first breach in the common-law rule had been
made by the California Supreme Court in Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 169 P.2d 913,
171 A.L.R. 1379 (1946); the legislation was designed to confirm and systematize the
change. Because of Mr. Livingston's article, we have available, as we do not often have
in connection with state legislation, what amounts to a comprehensive legislative history of
the statutes.
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There are at least 174 different fact situations which might
raise the question of the applicability of the statute in the conflictof-laws sense. Four factors have been recognized as potentially
significant for conflict-of-laws purposes in cases of this type:
i. The domicile (or residence) of the injured plaintiff; "
2. The domicile (or residence) of the tort-feasor; "
3. The place of the wrong;"5 and
4. The place where the action is brought."6
Each of the four factors may be domestic or foreign, and each may
be associated with a different state. There are, therefore, 256 possible combinations. Of these, however, 8i will have no factor connected with California; they are wholly foreign cases, and no one
would contend that the California statute should have any application. One case will be that in which all factors are associated
with California; it is purely domestic, and there is no question at
all about the applicability of the statute. There remain 174 cases"
with which California is connected in a potentially significant
way-i.e., in which the application of the statute might be consistent with, or essential to, effectuation of the California policy58
53. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 867, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953), 1
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 380 (1954). Domicile is a troublesome concept to work with, though it
is not so objectionable here as in commercial cases. Perhaps "residence," carefully defined,
would be better, although it has been suggested that domicile is preferable. Reese & Greene,
That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1953), A.A.L.S. REAMINGs 483.
In this Article the terms will be used interchangeably.
54. Note, Survival Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1263
(1955); see also HANCocK, ToRTs N tE CoN'Lsc'r op LAws 244 (1942).
55. See RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY 12.
56. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). This list of factors
contains no express mention of the place where the estate of the deceased tort-feasor is
being administered, but covers that factor by implication. Under the prevailing view, at
least, such an action can be brought only in a state where an administrator or executor for
the decedent has been appointed or qualified. REsrATEMENmr, CoNFLi'cr op LAws § 512,
comment a

(1934); see CstTHAm,

GOODRIca-,

GRIswoLD & REEEs,

CoNFLiar OF Lws

893-94 (4th ed. 1957). Hence it is assumed in this Article that the forum is always a state
in which the estate is being administered. If the forum is also the domicile of the deceased
tort-feasor, it is the state of domiciliary administration; otherwise (though more than one
state may claim domiciliary administration, Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343
[1942]; In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N.J. Eq. 599, 180 Ad. 633 [1935]) the administration
at the forum is assumed to be ancillary.
57. There are four factors, each of which may be connected with a different state.
Assuming that each of the four states may have a different law as to survival of a personal
injury action upon death of the tort-feasor (see Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 [9th Cir.
1949], discussed in the Appendix p. 249 infra), the formula for the possible combinations
where California has a potentially significant connection is 44-34-1.
58. This is a conservative figure which might easily be increased if certain assumptions were abandoned. Thus if there is ambiguity in any one of the factors-e.g., if it be
suggested that the "place of the wrong" may reasonably be taken to mean either the
place of acting or the place where the force takes effect to cause harm-an additional
factor is introduced and an additional state may be involved. This would increase the
number of possible conflict-of-laws cases to 2100.
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One might suppose that a recommendation of legislation to guide
the courts in the application of the California statute to cases involving foreign factors would give some consideration to how the
proposed legislation would affect the result in those 174 cases, and
how the results would comport with the policy underlying the survival statute. Mr. Sumner did not perform such an analysis for the
Legislature. In all fairness, he could hardly have been expected to
do so. Merely to enumerate the possible cases is a laborious task; to
visualize them all and to evaluate the play of varying policies in
each is an undertaking of considerable magnitude, which the
science of conflict of laws does not require of its votaries. The system assures us all that our task is far simpler, and Mr. Sumner proceeded faithfully in the belief that it is only necessary to determine
which one of the four contacts is the significant one, whereupon
all possible cases-all 174 of them-will be properly disposed of,
sight unseen. A court skeptical of the system, confronted with one
of the conflicts cases, might understandably prefer to know what
the rest of the cases look like before committing itself on faith to
a blanket disposition of them.
In general terms, at least, the policy embodied in the California
statute is not difficult to formulate. Damages for personal injuries
are regarded as compensation to the injured party. The award of
damages in private litigation is one of several alternative ways of
dealing with the economic and social problem of personal injuries.
One of the possible alternatives is for the state to provide for compensation."9 Underlying our free-enterprise choice is the possibility
that the state-the state concerned with the injured party-may
have a residual responsibility: if the system of free enterprise does
not provide compensation, the injured person may become a public
charge. It seemed illogical to the California Legislature that death
of the tort-feasor should put an end to the right to compensation.
Death of the tort-feasor seemed irrelevant both in terms of the
rights of the litigants and of the public interests involved. Whatever local interests might benefit from the common-law rule insulating the estate of the tort-feasor from liability were therefore
subordinated to the interest of the injured person, and to the public interest, in compensation.
59. See Financial Protection for the Motor Accident Victim, 3 LAw & CoNTmw. PRoB.
465 (1936) (symposium); see also EHRENzwxiG, "Fuu.Am" INSmutACE FOR = TRHc
Vcwm (1954).
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To formulate the policy of Arizona as expressed in its law on
the survival of tort actions is more difficult. Arizona has simply
retained the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. If the

truth were known, it would probably be that Arizona has retained
that rule simply because of the proverbial inertia of legal institudons, and that no real policy is involved."0 If an effort were made
to change the Arizona law, it may be speculated that the chief op.position would come from the insurance lobby, and would have
no higher motivation than to minimize the amount paid in
claims."' The Arizona law is no doubt archaic and out of harmony
with prevailing legal thought. That is not our affair here. The
business of courts in conflict-of-laws cases is not to judge the policies of the states, but to ascertain them and give them effect, so far
as possible, when there is a legitimate basis for effectuating them.
We must therefore do the best we can to formulate Arizona policy.
The statement that a cause of action for personal injuries is
"personal" is a bit of mysticism which tells us nothing about why
the injured party cannot sue the tort-feasor's estate; it tells us (if
anything) no more than that he cannot do so. The rule that the
cause of action abates apparently goes back to the time when the
penal conception of tort law prevailed; judgment in damages was
punishment visited upon the wrongdoer, not compensation for the
victim.62 An attempt to utilize the penal concept in formulating
Arizona policy will not get us very far, since the rule we are concerned with is purely negative. We cannot say, for example, that
since the Arizona law of torts is based on penal concepts, its bearing is on activity within the state, and conclude that Arizona law
should be applied when the conduct in question occurs there. For
Arizona does impose liability for injuries negligently inflicted in
the state, so long as the tort-feasor lives to be punished and does
not otherwise escape the jurisdiction. The law of survival of actions simply says that punishment will be withheld in cases where
the tort-feasor has died. That law cannot conceivably influence
any conduct on Arizona highways-except the conduct of the
60. This observation becomes particularly pointed when we note that Arizona has
a "revival" rule, preventing abatement when the tort-feasor dies after the action has been
commenced but before judgment. Aauz. REv. STAT., R. Civ. P. 25(a) (1956). See also
Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W.2d 96 (1933); Parsons v. American Trust & Banking
Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1934), discussed in the Appendix p. 249 infra.
61. To take into account, throughout, the realistic fact that liability insurance is
involved in many of the survival cases in conflict of laws would unduly complicate the
analysis. The fact should nevertheless be borne in mind.
62. See note 16 supra.
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Kamikaze driver, and we can hardly suppose it is intended to encourage that. The most rational policy that can apparently be attributed to Arizona is that the living should not be mulcted for the
wrongs of the dead:"3 that the interests represented in the estate
of the tort-feasor-his heirs, next of kin, devisees, legatees, creditors
-should not suffer because of what he did.
The focal point of California policy is the injured person; the
imposition of liability on the local estate seems but a corollary of
the purpose to provide compensation. California has an interest
in the application of its law and policy whenever the injured person is one toward whom California has a governmental responsibility. California may legitimately assert such an interest when the
injured person is domiciled in (or a resident of) California, and
also where he is present in the state at the time of injury. 4
The focal point of Arizona policy is the people who are interested in the estate of the deceased tort-feasor. Our analysis will
become excessively complex, however, if we attempt to treat Arizona policy as directed specifically to those persons; they may be
numerous and scattered. It seems necessary, therefore, in order to
avoid excessive particularism, to resort to fiction: to treat some
factor, other than the actual connection between the state and the
protected persons, as a symbol, providing sufficient basis for the
state's asserted interest in applying its policy although the persons
protected may not in fact be within the state's sphere of governmental concern. The administration of property within the state
might be an appropriate factor for this purpose." The domicile of
63. See Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597
(1934); Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N.Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
64. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); In re Vilas' Estate, 166 Ore. 115, 110 P.2d 940 (1941). The Supreme
Court has declined to be so particularistic as to inquire whether the injured person actually
became a burden to the state where the injury occurred. See Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at
413; see also Frankfurter, J., dissenting, id. at 414, 420-21. See also Comment, Conflictof-Laws Problemsin Workmen's Compensation: Carrollv. Lanza, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 515
(1956).
If the injured person dies, California's interest in requiring compensation notwithstanding the death of the tort-feasor remains substantially the same for present purposes.
There is the same need to secure reimbursement for medical and other services rendered
locally. The principal benficiaries of the compensation-the surviving dependents of the
deceased, or the persons interested in his estate-may not be local residents. It is nevertheless appropriate to regard the fact of his domicile in California as a sufficient basis for
the application of California's policy. The bases for application of Arizona's policy are
discussed infra.
65. Suppose the following case: All factors are associated with California alone except that the deceased tort-feasor left property in Arizona. An administrator is appointed in
Arizona and an action is brought there. There are no Arizona creditors and the sole heir
is a resident of California. Is there any basis for the application of Arizona law? (The
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the deceased tort-feasor within the state might be an appropriate
alternative. It seems inconsistent to seize upon both as appropriate.
If Arizona is to assert an interest in the application of its policy
when the tort-feasor was domiciled there, she should logically,
perhaps, confess the absence of an interest when that connecting
factor is absent. A state seeking to maximize its interests, however,
may indulge such an inconsistency if it chooses. The Constitution
will present an obstacle only when it can be said that the state has
no interest in the application of its policy.68 In view of the fact that
both domicile and situs have long been recognized as relevant factors in determining the disposition of decedents' property, it is unlikely that a state connected with the case by either factor would
be held without interest in the application of its law of abatement.
Accordingly, for the purposes of this Article Arizona is treated as
having an interest in the application of its law and policy whenever the deceased tort-feasor was domiciled there, and also whenever the action is brought in Arizona against an ancillary representative."
We are now in position to inquire how the statute proposed by
Mr. Sumner would affect the result in the possible conflicts cases,
and how those results would effectuate the policies of the states
involved. The proposed statute was: "In conflict of laws cases
the following matters shall ...be deemed substantive: . .. survival (.. .tort survival by the place of the tort) ...."" In other
words, in all 174 cases the law to be applied is that of the place of
injury. This, of course, is not Mr. Sumner's proposal alone; it is
the rule of the Restatement" and of the standard texts!'
problem may not be a serious one. Even if Arizona applies its law to defeat recovery, the
tort-feasor's property will become available to satisfy a California judgment if the ancillary
administrator delivers it to the domiciliary administrator. See REsrATEMENT, CoNFLrcr oF
LAws § 522 [1934]). See note 64 supra.
66. See pp. 237-39 infra.
67. The analysis which follows has also been applied on the basis of the alternative
hypotheses: i.e., that Arizona's interest is limited to the case where the deceased tort-feasor
was domiciled there, and that the interest is limited to the case in which action is brought
against an Arizona representative. Limitations of space preclude a detailed statement of
the result. It can be stated, however, that the results are so similar that the thesis of this
Article would not be affected, regardless of the basis employed. The hypothesis used in
the text makes the strongest possible case for application of Arizona law. Furthermore,
the analysis of the type case which corresponds to Grant v.McAuliffe is exactly the same
on each of the three hypotheses.
68. RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY 19-20. The number of conflicts cases disposed of
sight unseen by omitted portions of the proposed statute staggers the imagination. Even
the quoted portion goes far beyond the topic under consideration here, since the statute is
not limited to personal injuries nor to survival on death of the tort-feasor. See NEw Yosue
LAw REvIsION CoMMIssioN REPORT 171, 187 (1935).
69. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLcr OF LAws § 390 (1934).
70. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390.1 (1935); GoonuCu, CoNFLICr oF LAws
§ 101 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CoNILicT oF LAws 189-90 (2d ed. 1951).
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An array composed of 174 cases is an unwieldy subject for analysis. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that only two states
are involved, Arizona and California. On this basis, there are only
sixteen possible combinations of the four factors, one of which is
entirely domestic to California and one entirely foreign. This leaves
fourteen possible conflict-of-laws cases, as shown in Table i.'
TABLE I

Factors

0

Case

"

"
0

..................
2..................

3 ..................
4 ..................
5 ..................
6 ..................
7 ..................
8..................
9 ...............
io..................
ix..................

C

C C C

A

C

C
C
C
A
C
C
A
A
C

A

C
A
A
C
C
C
A
12.................... A A
13....................A A
14 .................... A C
15 .................... C A
16 ..................
A A

C

All factors domestic (i)

C

C C
AC
C A
C C
A C
A A
C A
A C
C A
A C

One
foreign actor

Two foreign factors (6)

J

C A

Three foreign factors ()

A A
A A
A A

All factors foreign (i)

* Forum, by definition, will be a place where the estate is being administered.
C-California
A-Arizona

If California adopts the rule that survival is determined by the
law of the place of injury, by legislation or by court decision, she
immediately renounces any interest in having the California law
and policy applied in half of the possible cases. Of the remaining
71. Actually, this array includes all of the possible conflicts cases, under our assumptions, if we assume that only two types of laws are involved: those providing absolutely
for survival and those providing absolutely for abatement.
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seven, in which an interest in the application of California law is
asserted, California can be sure of the application of her law in only
three, because only three are in California courts. Such a rule,
then, would assure the application of California law and policy in
only three of the fourteen possible conflict-of-laws situations, and
then only if such application were not unconstitutional; it would
result in the application of California law and policy in four additional cases if Arizona were to follow faithfully the same rule; it
would assure the application of Arizona law and policy in four
cases in which the place of injury is Arizona and the forum is California; and it would result in the application of Arizona law and
policy in three additional cases if Arizona follows the same rule.
As I have remarked in connection with another conflict-of-laws
problem,"2 this seems on the face of it an extraordinarily diffident
position for a "sovereign" state to take concerning a policy which
it holds with some conviction. The policy is to control in only half
of the possible cases, and in a majority of those only by sufferance
of a foreign state. Let us examine the cases which, under such a
rule, California would (i) determine to control, (2) express the
hope of controlling, and (3) renounce any interest in controlling.
The three cases in which the rule asserts applicability of the
California law and in which California courts have power to effect
that result are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Factors
0

Case

"8
0

o

o

2 ..........................

A

C

C

C

3 ........................
6 ........................

C
A

A
A

C
C

C
C

In Case 2 the application of California law makes excellent
sense. California interests are advanced without impairment of
72. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. Cm. L REv. 226 (1958).
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any interest of Arizona. Arizona's policy relates only to the estates
of its domiciliaries and to property being administered in that
state. California has no similar policy protecting the estates of
decedents. California has an interest in applying its policy since
it may incur responsibility to the person injured in the state. Of
course, the injured person is a foreigner, and if California were
utterly and shortsightedly selfish she might wish to discriminate
against him in favor of those interested in the local estate. There
would be no defensible basis for doing so, however. California has
retained no subsidiary policy of protecting estates against "punitive" liability, but has discarded the whole punitive concept as
applied to this problem. Both the privileges and immunities
clause 3 and the equal protection clause' would present obstacles
to such discrimination.
In Case 3, application of California law furthers California interests. California is doubly interested in the victim, a resident
injured in the state. This result is achieved, however, at the expense
of Arizona's interest, as we have defined it, since the deceased tortfeasor was domiciled in Arizona. The California judgment will
indirectly reduce the amount ultimately to be distributed in accordance with Arizona law (at least to the extent that the California estate consists of movables) '
In Case 6, application of California law still makes sense. California's interest in the injured plaintiff is based solely on the fact
that he was injured here, but that has been regarded as a substantial
basis."' But Arizona policy is involved to the same extent as in
Case 3, since the tort-feasor was domiciled there. It is not involved
to a greater degree by virtue of the victim's residence in Arizona,
since that state has no policy calling for compensation to injured
plaintiffs where the tort-feasor has died.
73. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U.S. 60 (1920); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). See also Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919);
see note 64 supra.
74. U.S. Cowsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
75. Under the law as it stands, a judgment against the California administrator
would not be entitled to full faith and credit in an action in Arizona against the domiciliary administrator. Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U.S. 82 (1908); Johnson v. Powers,
139 U.S. 156, 159 (1891); Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 Ad. 107 (1918). But see
Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891). See R.STATEMENT, CoNFLcr oF LAws §510
(1934); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HAmv. I Rwv. 1210, 1226
(1946).
76. See note 64 supra.
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The four cases in which adoption of the rule indicates a desire
on the part of California that California law be applied by other
courts are shown in Table 3TABLE 3
Factors
0

Case

0

0

o

0
0
0

C
5 ........................
A
9 ........................
I1 .......................... C
13.......................... A

a

:E

C
C
A
A

0

-.

0

C
C
C
C

E

A
A
A
A

In Case 5, California has every reason to wish its law applied.
That would be the result in a California court (Case i). That result cannot be reached, however, without impairment of Arizona
interests. These interests may seem attenuated; we have noted that
they are to some extent supported by fiction. It is even conceivable
that Arizona might defer to the law of California, at least if movables are involved, since California is the state of domiciliary administration. We have leaned over backward, however, to give
Arizona policy its most intelligible content and its maximum
scope; and the policy we have recognized is involved here. Hence
the result would be to advance California interests at the expense
of those of Arizona.
In Case 9, California again would desire application of its law.
That would be the result in a California court (Case 2). Here California's interest in the injured plaintiff is less strong, since he is a
nonresident; Arizona's interest remains what it was in Case 5 . That
interest does not gather strength from the fact that the injured person is a local resident, since Arizona has no relevant compensatory
policy, and an attempt to favor the local resident at the expense
of the nonresident's estate would probably run afoul of the privileges and immunities clause. But such as it is, the interest re77. I.e., if the resident plaintiff in Case 9 were allowed to maintain the action, the
nonresident plaintiff in Case 5 could complain that the denial of his right to maintain the
action constitutes a withholding from a citizen of another state of a privilege given citizens
of Arizona. See note 73 supra.
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mains, and the result of applying California law would advance
California interests at the expense of those of Arizona.
In Case ii, California's interest in having its law applied is twofold, and so, in a sense, is Arizona's. We need not stop to inquire
whether Arizona's interest is fortified by the concurrence of domicile and suit in that state, for we do not assume to "weigh" the respective interests. It is not significant that one state is connected
with the case by interest-supporting factors in more ways than is
the other."' What is significant is that the respective interests are
in conflict. Here, California interests would be advanced at the
expense of Arizona interests.
In Case 13, California retains a substantial, though diminished,
interest. Although three of the four factors are associated with Arizona, the fact that the injury occurred in California suggeststhough it does not necessarily follow-that California may become
very deeply concerned. The injured person may be indigent; California residents, even the state itself, may be called upon in simple
humanity to make substantial expenditures for his care after the
injury. The deceased tort-feasor may have left no property outside
Arizona. If the injured person is not allowed to maintain an action against the tort-feasor's solvent estate in the only place where
action can be brought, California interests will suffer. The case
for application of California law is so strong as to make the supposed Arizona interest seem almost frivolous by comparison; but
we must remind ourselves that it is not the business of courts in
conflict-of-laws cases to appraise the relative merits of the laws and
policies of the respective states where a legitimate basis exists for
the application of the law that is applied. The result in Case 13
will advance California interests, but at the expense of Arizona
interests.
Under the rule that the law of the place of injury governs survival, California would renounce any interest in having its law
applied in seven cases. In four of these, shown in Table 4, California can effect the application of foreign law, since the action is
in a California court.
In Case 4 the application of Arizona law would make no sense
whatever. An injured California resident is involved, and Cali78. Nor do the concurrent interests of two or more states outweigh the interest of
one. Suppose that in a case of the general type represented by Case 5 (C C C A) the
victim is a resident of California but was injured in a third state whose law, like California's,
provides for survival. The problem for the Arizona court would remain the same;
whether to subordinate the interests of the forum to those of other states.
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TABLE 4
Factors
0

Case

"o

0

*

u

o
C
4 ........................
C
7 ........................
io........................ A
z .......................... A

0

ro

4
C
A
C
A

A
A
A
A

C
C
C
C

fornia policy requires compensation for him. California is the
state of domiciliary administration. Arizona has not the slightest
interest in the matter's being decided according to Arizona law.
So far as appears, no property of the decedent is being administered in Arizona. Even if there were ancillary administration
there, Arizona's presumed interest would be confined to that administration, and is not affected by the proceeding at the domicile.
As a matter of fact, policy or no policy, Arizona's true interest here
would seem to cry aloud for the application of the California law
of survival. If the person injured in Arizona is indigent, the Good
Samaritans of that state who spend their energies and substance in
ministering to him will go uncompensated if he is denied the right
to maintain his action. This interest, however, has not been recognized by the Arizona legislature. The same injustice would result
in a domestic case in Arizona. In the realm of conflict of laws it is
not our business to remake misguided state policy. Let us therefore
not overstate the case by suggesting that Arizona policy is subverted
also. The rule that the law of the place of injury governs here subverts Californa policy with no advancement of any policy of Arizona.
Case 4, by the way, is precisely the case of Grant v. McAuliffe.
The California court, by applying California law, advanced California interests with no expense to any interest of any foreign state.
This, the critics say, must not be allowed to happen again; the California court must be required by the Legislature to subvert the interests of California with no advantage to the interests of any state.
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In Case 7, application of Arizona law advances Arizona's interests at the expense of those of California. The injured person is a
California resident. Property which belonged to the decedent is
being administered in California. The fact that the injury occurred
in Arizona provides no basis for the application of that state's law,
since Arizona has no relevant policy. Arizona's interest in the application of its policy of insulating the living from liability for
wrongs of the dead is predicated solely on the Arizona domicile
of the deceased wrongdoer; yet the conventional rule for choice of
law would require the California court to frustrate California's
interest in favor of Arizona's.
Case io presents an interesting phenomenon. Application of
Arizona law impairs no interest of California. The injured person
was not a resident and was not injured there. On the other hand,
that result advances no interest of Arizona. Though the injured
person is both a resident of Arizona and is injured there, Arizona
has no policy of compensation for him. If California law were applied instead, California interests would be neither advanced nor
impaired; nor would those of Arizona.
This is the "unprovided case" in a very special sense. Neither
state cares what happens. 9 Traditionalists may stand aghast at this
anomaly, and take it as proof of the unsoundness of the analysis.
If so, they may be reminded that the same kind of lacuna can occur
under the traditional system. "° The phenomenon is not, in fact, a
surprising one. While the laws of California and Arizona on the
subject of survival of personal injury actions are different, the policies expressed in those laws are not in conflict here. It may be that
the laws of neither state, nor of both states together, purport to dispose of the entire universe of possible cases. Identical laws do not
necessarily mean identical policies, and different laws do not necessarily mean conflicting policy, when it is remembered that the
scope of policy is limited by the legitimate interests of the respective
states.
79. This analysis holds true under the alternative assumptions, that the interest of
Arizona is limited to its domiciliaries or to property administered in the state.
80. See Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. 1883). There the two states
involved had almost identical statutes of frauds, and the contract in suit satisfied the requirements of neither. The court held that neither statute was applicable. The statute of
New York, where the action was brought, was held to be applicable only to contracts
made within the state; the statute of Missouri, where the contract was made, was held to
apply only to actions brought in that state. This construction was formalistic and literal,
to be sure (though it seems to be approved by the RrsAT.ENT, CoNs'azsr oF LAws §§
334, 598, 602 [1934]) but similar results can be reached by defensible analysis. See also
Yntema, The Objectives of Private InternationalLaw, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721, 739 (1957).
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Cases such as this do arise,8 and when they do they must be disposed of. Traditional choice-of-law rules provide a means of disposing of them without concerning ourselves about the result.
Apart from such mechanistic devices, there are perhaps four waysin which such a case might be decided by a California court:
I. Since no California policy would be infringed by holding
the California estate liable, and since the Arizona law is offensive
to the modern and humane legal mind, the court might apply California law because it is the more enlightened and humane law, and
because it provides a better solution to the underlying social and
economic problem. In this specific context such a rationale has
strong appeal, since neither state's interests can be impaired by the
result. If there is any place for cadi justice, it is in the areas where
there is no relevant law. Even in such a harmless context, however,
this does not seem a sound approach. Conflict-of-laws cases do not
provide courts with a license which they do not otherwise have to
condemn the law and policy of a state on the ground that it is
archaic, or misguided, or socially and economically unwise. If we
condone such an approach here, we shall have difficulty in resisting
it when the respective policies are in conflict, and even when the
archaic and misguided law is that of the forum-and when enlightened opinions may differ on the question of which is the better
law and policy.8"
81. See Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 92 A.L.R. 1499 (1933); Dalton v. McLean,
137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940), discussed in Appendix p. 252 inlra.
82. Since this is a major point in my argument, and since it constitutes a departure
from the counsels of several writers from whom I have drawn inspiration, an explanation
is advisable here though it would constitute a digression in the text.
It has several times been suggested, more or less explicitly, that courts in conflict-oflaws cases should choose the law which appeals to the sense of justice, Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REv. 483, 490 (1931), especially where one of the
laws is plainly archaic and out of harmony with prevailing legal thought. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HAnv. L. Rnv. 173 (1933), A.A.L.S. READNGs
101, 105, 114; Freund, supra note 75, at 1216; Yntema, supra note 80, at 738; Cook,
"Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties, 32 ILL. L. REv. 899
(1932), A.A.L.S. READINGs 639. The law rejected as archaic or unjust may be domestic
or foreign.
As applied to domestic laws, the suggestion is a disturbing one, since opinions may
differ as to the wisdom or obsolescence of laws, and courts do not lightly nullify the laws
of their own state on such grounds. I do not question that courts have a degree of freedom
to abrogate obsolete domestic laws. I do suggest that, when they are convinced that a
domestic law is archaic and unjust, they should abrogate it entirely, instead of utilizing the
looseness of the system of conflict of laws as an excuse for limited abrogation. Thus the
Supreme Court of Nebraska severely limited the scope of the maxim, actio moritur cum
persona,without waiting for statutory authorization, In re Estate of Grainger, 121 Neb. 338,
237 N.W. 153 (1941), and the California Supreme Court accomplished the same result
by a tour de force of statutory construction, Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 169 P.2d 913,
171 A.L.R. 1379 (1946).
When the repugnant law is that of a foreign state, of course, the court has no opportunity to abrogate it for all purposes. But if interests of the foreign state alone are con-
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The court might adopt a supremely selfish and provincial
view. The action, after all, is by a foreigner against the estate of
a local resident. Why not, then, withhold application of California's compensatory law? Why not adopt a rule that the California
law will not be applied when the plaintiff is a nonresident and the
tort-feasor was a resident ?s3 The rather clear answer is that such a
rule, denying to residents of other states a privilege enjoyed by
residents of California, would amount in substance to a discrimination against citizens of other states and would be in conflict with
the privileges and immunities clause. The circumstance of residence does not have here any independent significance such as
sometimes provides a basis for treating residents and nonresidents
differently."
3. A refined version of the approach suggested in (2), above,
might seem more civilized and more likely to surmount the constitutional barrier. The suggested rule discriminating between
residents and nonresidents actually goes beyond the conditions on
which our array of cases is constructed; in our table only two states
are involved, and the content of each state's law is known. Case co
is A C A C. The generalized case may involve California and one
or two unidentified states, only the law of California being known.
Thus in the complete array this basic set of facts will appear six
times, one of the forms being X C X C, where X represents a third
state whose law on survival is not known. The discriminatory rule
suggested above is broad enough to apply to the generalized case;
it discriminates against the nonresident irrespective of the law of
his home state on survival. Suppose the court were to formulate a
rule to the effect that California law will not be applied in an action by a nonresident against the estate of a resident except where
the law of the state of the plaintiff's residence provides for survival.
This is not a raw discrimination between residents (or citizens) of
2.

cerned, there is no reason why the court should seek abrogation of the law for any purpose.
Where there is a true conflict of interests between the two states, the court is justified,
under the argument in this Article, in applying its own law without regard to the relative
merits of the two laws.
83. In the Grant case the court said: "When, as in the present case, all of the parties
were residents of this state, and the estate of the deceased tort feasor is being administered
in this state, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the law of
this state ....
" 41 Cal.2d at 867, 264 P.2d at 949. From this Mr. Sumner gratuitously
inferred that, if the plaintiff were a nonresident, other facts remaining the same, the court
would apply Arizona law, and suggested that the result would violate the privileges and
immunities clause. Rzcom mNDXA- N AND Sruny 10. The inference is totally unwarranted, though the conclusion as to constitutionality is sound.
84. See note 73 supra.
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California and nonresidents (or citizens of another state) as such.
All injured persons are classified as belonging either to states which
provide the protection of survival statutes or to states which do not.
Yet the argument does not carry conviction. We cannot plausibly
say that, in enacting the survival statute, California merely subordinated one interest to another, and that it retains a subsidiary
interest in protecting local estates against "punitive" liability. Nor
can we plausibly say that the law of the plaintiff's residence on the
subject of survival defines the plaintiff's status. What would his
status be: that of caput lupinum in relation to the Kamikaze
driver? The suggested rule seems not so much a differential treatment in good faith of persons differently situated as a mere attempt
to preclude recovery by as many foreigners as possible. It is questionable whether the classification overcomes the objection based
on the privileges and immunities clause. In any case, that question
ought to be academic; for if California's legitimate interests are
consulted there is no reason whatever why the court should not
willingly apply California law.
4. Finally, the court might apply California law simply on the
basis that this is the rational and convenient way to try a lawsuit
when no good purpose is to be served by putting the parties to the
expense and the court to the trouble of ascertaining the foreign
law." No useful purpose will be served by ascertaining and applying Arizona law, since the result is a matter of entire indifference
in terms of the policies of both states.
In Case 12, application of the law of the place of injury advances
Arizona interests without impairment of any interest of California
-on the assumptions which have been made as to the scope of
Arizona's interest. The case, however, sharply suggests the question, Who is to determine the proper scope of Arizona policy? In
this Article, that scope has been made as extensive as possible, for
the academic purpose of strengthening the argument. A California
court, however, is under no compulsion to assume that Arizona's
85. Standing alone, this argument is open to the objection that the case cannot be
classified as one in which the result is a matter of indifference until the foreign law is
known. If, however, there were a general presumption in favor of applying the law of the
forum, and a disposition to apply foreign law only where some useful purpose would be
srved thereby, counsel and the court could know in advance that there would be no point
in ascertaining the foreign law, since, even if it provided for abatement, no useful purpose
would be served by applying it. A real economy might therefore result. In addition, an
intelligent inquiry into the foreign law may well require more than a simple answer to
the question whether survival is permitted; e.g., it may be significant that the foreign law
allows revival. See Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W.2d 96 (1933); Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1934), discussed in Appendix,
p. 250 infra.
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interest is similarly extensive-especially in the absence of any
declaration in the matter by Arizona authorities-and might well
interpret the legitimate scope of Arizona policy more narrowly.
If, for example, California were to interpret Arizona's policy as
being limited to the administration of property in that state, Case
12 would become, like Case io, one in which the result would be
a matter of indifference in terms of the respective policies, and in
which California law should be applied for the reasons which have
been stated.
Finally, Table 5 shows the three cases in which adoption of the
rule that the law of the place of injury governs would be a renunciation of any desire on the part of California that her law be applied,
and in which the result would be controlled by the foreign court.
TABLE 5
Factors
0

Case

.
C

-.
0
0

V

0

1Z

.

C
C
A

A
A
A

2

0

o0

8 ........................
C
14 .......................... A
15 .......................... C

A
A
A

In Case 8, the application of the law of the place of injury will
advance Arizona's interests while frustrating those of California.
In Case 14, the result will advance Arizona interests without
impairing any interest of California.
In Case 15, the result will frustrate California interests while
advancing the interests of Arizona.
Table 6 summarizes the results of applying the law of the place
of injury. That table shows that to impose on the California court
a statutory obligation to apply blindly the law of the place of injury
would be to require the subversion of California policy in four of
the fourteen possible cases (Groups IV and VI)-in one of them
(Group VI)-with no compensating advancement of Arizona
policy. In addition, it would require the application of foreign law
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TABLE 6

I. California interest advanced without
detriment to Arizona interests ............ Case 2 (A C C C) ()
II. Arizona interest advanced without
detriment to California interests .......... Case i2 (A A A C)
Case 14 (A C A A) (2)
III. California interest advanced at
expense of Arizona interest ............... Case 3 (CA
Case 5 (C C
Case 6 (A A
Case 9 (A C
Case ix (C A
Case 13 (A A

C C)
CA)
C C)
CA)
C A)
C A) (6)

IV. Arizona interest advanced at
expense of California interest ............. Case 7 (CA A
Case 8 (C CA
Case 15 (C A A
V. Neither interest affected ................. Case io (A C A
VI. California interest impaired without
advancing any Arizona interest ........... Case 4 (C C A

C)
A)
A)
C)
C) (i)

where the application of domestic law is more sensible and convenient (Group V). While California interests would be preferred
to those of Arizona in six cases (Group III), the result is not, for
all the cases, within California's control; it will follow only if
Arizona chooses to apply the same rule, since four of these cases
are in Arizona courts. I repeat that the Law Revision Commission's
decision not to recommend the enactment of that choice-of-law
rule was (shall we say) well advised.
Table 6 can be read also from Arizona's point of view. Application of the place-of-injury rule would require the subordination
of local to foreign interests in six cases (Group III)-four of them
in Arizona courts-while local interests would be preferred to
foreign in only three (Group IV). In addition, Arizona courts
might well feel somewhat silly in striking down the progressive
policy of California in Case 4 (Group VI) where the result would
not advance any Arizona interest."8
86. From Arizona's point of view the case in which the law to be applied is a matter
of indifference (Group V) suggests an interesting question. Arizona, of course, can have
no possible objection to the application of California law. How would Arizona decide the
same case? The question is academic; the problem cannot possibly arise. The case is in
a California court; and, since the forum in this problem is significant because the estate is
being administered there, a significant factor is changed if a different forum is assumed.
If we assume in Case 10 that the action is in Arizona, Case 10 becomes Case 14, in which
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This should help to answer a question which Mr. Sumner
states twice in his study. "Had death not occurred, the law of the
place of the tort would have been used....
Why should death
affect this usual approach ?"8 "Had there been no death this law

would have been used. Why should death diminish the importance
of the place of the wrong?"8 " The answer is that, while it sometimes makes sense to apply the law of the place of the wrong with
respect to some questions," it makes no sense whatever to apply
the law of the place of the wrong concerning survival in a fact situation such as was presented in Grantv. McAuliffe.
It is true that the rule that the law of the place of injury governs will produce uniformity of result from state to state in any
given fact situation if other states join California in adherence to
the same rule and apply it consistently in the same way. Experience in this and other areas shows that it is unrealistic to expect
that such uniformity will in fact result. 0 Even in the field of conflict of laws, courts are inclined to be concerned with practical
results, and may not concentrate exclusively on theories such as
those of territorial jurisdiction and vested rights. When they
recognize that the result dictated by the summum bonum of uniformity is a reprehensible one, they may revolt against the system,
using one or another of the available escape devices. The uniformity and certainty promised by the system are therefore to a large
extent illusory." But even if the discipline of the system were to
hold, and the ideal of uniformity were attained as advertised,
would the gain be worth its cost? Uniformity comes high when
the application of Arizona law advances Arizona interests without impairing those of California. If the question were presented, it would provide a hard test of the position taken
in this Article as to how California should dispose of the case. An important question
would be whether, no policy considerations being involved, uniformity of result from
state to state is not in fact the highest goal. But the question is not raised. Whether it can
be presented in the context of another type of problem I do not know.
87. REcoMMENDATImo AND STUDy 16.
88. Id. at 17.
89. See Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1956);
Morris, The ProperLaw of a Tort, 64 HA.v. L. Rzv. 881 (1951).
90. See Appendix, p. 249 ;nfra.
91. Moreover, the objective of uniformity, laudable enough when other things are
equal, seems badly overgeneralized. So far as appears from the report of Grant v. McA4diffe, there was no possibility that the action could have been brought in any other
place. The estate of the decedent was being administered at the domicile and nowhere
else; so far as appears, he had no property that could have been the subject of administration elsewhere. Why, then, should California renounce its interests for the sake of averting
a disuniformity which is impossible? So also, in Case 10, where the choice of law is a
matter of indifference. Why should the California court be required to shape its judgment
so as to conform to an imagined judgment in a foreign court, when such a foreign judgment is an impossibility? Certainly, minor changes in the fact situation in the Grant case
could create the possibility of suit in two states. Does it follow that the court should distort its decision in a case in which no service to the ideal of uniformity is possible?
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it results in the frustration of California law and policy in four of
the possible fourteen cases, and in the other anomalies noted in
Table 6.
In closing this phase of the discussion, it may be interesting to
return to the suggestion made earlier,"2 that liability insurance may
be a factor worth considering in conflict-of-laws cases of this kind.
In any of the fourteen cases, the tort-feasor may have carried insurance. The insurance may or may not be enough to cover the
claims; the estate may or may not be sufficient to pay any excess of
the amount recovered over the policy limits. For present purposes
we are not particularly concerned with insurance when the choice
of law results in application of California's law of survival. In
seven cases, however, the rule advocated by Mr. Sumner results in
the application of Arizona law, abating the action. In three of
these, that rule results in the advancement of Arizona interests at
the expense of California interests (Case 7 [CAAC], Case 8
[C CAA], and Case 15 [CAAA]). It may be some small consolation to defenders of the system that, despite the subversion of
California interests, those of Arizona are furthered. But suppose
the truth in the case before the court is that the tort-feasor was fully
insured? In that event, any interest of Arizona in the matter evaporates completely," unless, perchance, the insurance company is an
Arizona enterprise, and the Arizona policy can rationally be interpreted as designed to protect such enterprises from liability in
the fortuitous event of the tort-feasor's death. Arizona's policy, in
the discussion thus far, has been charitably interpreted as a fairly
intelligible, though primitive, desire to shield the innocent heirs
of the wrongdoer from suffering the penalty for his misdeeds. But
the estate cannot suffer where there is adequate liability insurance.
In such circumstances, to apply the law of the place of injury to
Cases 7, 8, and 15 would be to subvert California policy with no
advancement of any Arizona policy whatever; and the result would
be as unfortunate as it would have been in Grant v. McAuliffe if
the court had applied that law."'
92. See note 61 supra.
93. See In re Vilas' Estate, 166 Ore. 115, 133, 110 P.2d 940, 947-48 (1941).
94. The insurance problem would not intrude here if it were universally the law
that the injured person has a right against the insurance company which he can assert
directly at least when his rights against the tort-feasor are abated by the tort-feasors death.
Efforts to obtain general agreement on such a minimum principle would be better directed
than efforts to achieve general agreement on the rule that the law of the place of injury
controls.
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IV
It would be less than frank not to confess that I find Mr. Sumner's views on the constitutionality of the decision in Grant Z.McAuliffe simply flabbergasting. Mr. Sumner says: "On the basis of
the Supreme Court cases one cannot definitely say that the decision
in Grant v. McAulife violates the due process clause. However,
the writer is of the opinion that it does and that ultimately we can
expect a ruling by the Supreme Court to this effect."9 As if that
were not enough, he adds: "In a subsequent section the policies
involved in determining whether a survival or revival statute is
substantive or procedural are indicated. These goals to be sought
in conflict-of-laws cases cannot be realized under the Grant decision. For this reason I think it violates the full faith and credit
clause."96
Reflect upon this for a moment. California law was applied in
a case being litigated in a California court. All persons involved
in the collision were citizens of California. The deceased tortfeasor's estate was being administered at his domicile in California
and nowhere else. That the result reached did justice as between
the parties to the action has been questioned by no one. The decision furthered California's progressive policy of saving the injured
person's right to compensation instead of terminating that right on
the tort-feasor's death. It did this with no impairment whatever
of any interest of Arizona. Arizona had no conceivable interest in
the application of Arizona law to the case. If the Constitution of
the United States forbids such a decision, and if it requires instead
that California apply Arizona law, working a result which would
be unjust as between the parties, subversive of California's humane
policy, and devoid of any tendency to further the interests of a
sister state, then the Constitution is an arbitrary and capricious
instrument indeed.
Of course, there is nothing in the Constitution to warrant such
ideas as these. They could result only from the inane automatisms
of that mindless and ruthless machine for the disposition of conflict-of-laws cases in which we have been taught that we must place
our faith, and which inexorably assigns to a single state "legislative
jurisdiction" to control the outcome of any conceivable case, not
95. REcomMENDATIoN AND S-UY 9.

96. Id. at 10.
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only without regard to the implications of the result but with utter
indifference to what the result itself may be.
It seems quite unnecessary to lengthen this Article by an extended consideration of the constitutional "issues" involved in the
Grant case. It may be conceded that the course of the Supreme
Court's treatment of conflict-of-laws cases on the constitutional level
has not been even. It may be conceded that there have been times
in the past when the Court seemed disposed to abdicate its adjudicative function in favor of the machineY It may be conceded that
there are still certain categories of cases in which the Court's decisions run counter to the developing trendy8 In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that the role of the full faith
and credit clause and of the due process clause in choice-of-law cases
is a minimal one. When a state has a policy of its own, and when
the state's connection with a case is such as to constitute a reasonable and substantial basis for the state's assertion of an interest in
applying its policy, neither the full faith and credit clause nor the
due process clause requires it to apply the law of another state in
preference to its own. When the asserted policy has no demonstrable existence, or when there is no such connection as to warrant
the assertion of an interest in applying the policy, then these clauses
have a function to perform. " But the legitimacy of a state's asserted
interest is no longer measured in terms of rubrics such as "substantive" and "place of injury." Fortunately, the shibboleths of the
Restatement have not been incorporated in the Constitution 0
If we are to talk constitutional issues, I have an opinion of my
97. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 92
A.L.R. 928 (1934); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
98. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 173 A.L.R. 1107
(1947). See Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414 (1955).
99. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 74 A.L.R. 701 (1930); see
also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
100. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 145
A.L.R. 1113 (1943); Pink v. AAA Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201, 137 A.L.R. 957
(1941); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Brandeis, J.,
dissenting in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 377 (1918).
"The connections or contacts which have been employed in determining the
power of the state are of two principal kinds. One set is made up of the connections
which are employed in the usual conflict of laws rules and which may have been
The other set, which fortunately have
refined into a somewhat artificial form ....
been emphasized in the later cases, are the substantial rather than the technical connections of a state with the occurrence."
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 Vawm. L. Rav. 581, 601 (1953), A.A.L.S.
REaDINs 255, 271. See also Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of
the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 27 (1945), A.A.L.S. READINGs 229, 249.
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own to offer: The decision in Grant v. McAuliffe was not in conflict with any provision of the Constitution. On the contrary: if
it is true, as I believe, that a "grossly unreasonable"'' choice-of-law
rule denies due process of law; if it is true, as I believe, that a choiceof-law rule is grossly unreasonable when it invokes the law of a
state having no substantial connection with the case;'°---and if it
is true, as I believe, that the substantiality of a state's connection
with a case is to be judged in terms of social and economic policy
factors rather than in terms of refined, technical, and artificial concepts' 0 '-then a different decision, employing the Arizona law of
abatement, when Arizona had no such connection with the case as
to provide any rational basis for an interest in the application of its
law and policy, would have been a rather dear violation of the due
process clause. 1"
V
The fourteen cases, as arrayed in Table 6, fall into two main
classes, if we defer for a moment consideration of the case in Group
V. The four cases in the first class (Groups I, II, and VI) present
no real problem. The nine cases in the second class (Groups III
and IV) present real problems; but they are problems which cannot be solved by any science or method of conflict of laws.
The basic problem in conflict of laws is to reconcile or resolve
the conflicting interests of different states" The four cases in the
first class involve no conflicting interests. The result which should
be reached in each is perfectly clear. In Group I, the interests of
California can be advanced without impairment of those of Arizona. It happens that this is the result produced by choice of the
law of the place of injury. In Group II the interests of Arizona can
be advanced without detriment to those of California. It happens
that this is the result produced by choice of the law of the place of
injury. In Group VI the interests of California can be advanced
without detriment to any interest of Arizona. This is not the result
101. Cheatham, supra note 100, at 586, A.A.L.S. READiNGs at 259. See Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 74 A.L.R. 701 (1930).
102. Cheatham, supra note 100, at 586, A.A.L.S. READiNGs at 259.
103. Id. at 601-2, A.A.L.S. READINGs at 271-72. See also cases cited in note 100
supra.
104. "A rule of conflict of laws, for example, would be grossly unreasonable if it
directed that the rights under an occurrence be governed by the law of a state which had
no substantial connection with the occurrence." Cheatham, supra note 100, at 586, A.A.L.S.
READINGs at 259.
105. See Jackson, supra note 100, at 26-27, A.A.L.S. RPADiNGs at 248-49.
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produced by choice of the law of the place of injury. Perversely,
the system here demands that in the sacred name of uniformity,
or something, California interests be frustrated although there is
no conflicting interest.
In short, the system devised for dealing with the problem of
conflicting interests generates in this situation nearly half as many
false problems as there are real problems-and then proceeds to
solve the false problems, in one fourth of the cases, in an obviously
unacceptable way.
The nine cases in the second class present real problems of conflicting interests. The system conceived for solving them does not
do so. It only creates an illusion of doing so by pretending that
they do not exist. The system never composes nor reconciles; under
a "choice-of-law" regime one interest or the other must yield. This
unpleasant fact is concealed by the system, which does not countenance talk of conflicting interests. It talks of law and of the nature
of law, and of transcendental principles which assign to one state,
and only one, "jurisdiction" to determine the outcome of a case.
Under such a system, of course, there can be no such thing as a
conflict between the policies of two or more legitimately interested
states.
And how does the system dispose of the nine cases which present real problems? In six of the cases it strikes down Arizona's
interest in favor of California's; in three it strikes down California's in favor of Arizona's. It does this casually, impersonally, without malice-and also without any attention whatever to the relative
merits of the respective policies, or even to their existence. The
fact that California's policy is allowed to prevail in a majority of
the cases is, from the standpoint of the system, a fortuitous consequence of the fact that the critical factor-place of injury-is not
wholly unrelated to the interests involved. In a different situation,
where the decisive factor is quite irrelevant to the policy considerations, the policy of one state is made to yield exactly as many times
as is the policy of the other-i.e., the result is dictated by pure
chance.'1°

No state, by its unilateral action, can solve these problems. Nor
can all states, by the concurrent adoption of the same choice-of-law
106. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. Cm. L. REv. 226 (1958).
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rule, solve them, even if all states consistently apply the common
rule in the same way. We have seen the havoc that would be
worked by uniform choice of the law of the place of injury. The
rule that the law of the forum should govern-relied on to justify
the result in Grant v. McAuliffe-if understood as a rule to be
applied not only by the California courts but also, concurrently,
by the courts of Arizona, would be scarcely preferable. While it
happens that that rule would give satisfactory results in three of
the false-problem cases (Cases 2, 4, and 14), it would result in
subversion of California's interests in six of the nine cases that
present real problems. This is why I cannot believe that the court
meant its rationale to be interpreted as a choice-of-law rule to be
adopted by all states in place of the rule of the Restatement. The
court which decided Grantv. McAuliffe would not seek a result so
absurd and so contrary to California's interests.'
What, then, was the California court doing in Grant v. McAuliffe? What should a court do in such a case, if the taught
system of choice of law is as wretched and spurious as it seems?
The two questions, I think, can be given a single answer. In the
first place, the court was deciding one case at a time-the case
before it. It was not deciding 173 other cases, unstated, unvisualized, unbriefed, and unappraised. It did not try to formulate a
universal rule for choice of the law governing survival. It turned
its back on the whole futile business of universal choice-of-law
rules, and on the machine for disposing of conflicts cases without
thought. It set itself to determine whether justice under California
law required application of California's survival statute to the case
at bar, and decided that it did. Or, as I would put it, the court
inquired whether California's connection with the case was such
that California could legitimately assert an interest in the application of its policy, and found an affirmative answer. It found
no reason why Arizona law should be considered. Or, as I would
put it, the court inquired whether Arizona's connection with the
107. The rule that the law of the deceased tort-feasor's domicile should govern (advocated in Note, 68 Hnv. L. Rav. 1260, 1263 [1955]) would give the following results (in
shorthand terms of Table 6): California interests advanced without detriment to Arizona
interests, two (Cases 2 and 4); Arizona interest advanced without detriment to California
interests, one (Case 12); California interest advanced at expense of Arizona interest, three
(Cases 5, 8, 9); Arizona interest advanced at expense of California interest, six (Cases
3, 6, 7, 11, 13, 15); neither interest affected, one (Case 10); Arizona interest impaired
without advancing any interest of California (the converse of Group VI), one (Case 14).
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case was such as to support the assertion of an interest on the
part of Arizona in the application of Arizona policy, and found a
negative answer. In other words, confronted with a false problem
created by the machine, the court ignored the machine's perverse
solution and adjudicated the case. This, I think, is precisely what
it should have done.
Table 7 compares the results which would be reached in the
fourteen cases if California's legitimate interests were consulted
(column i); if Arizona's interests were consulted (column 2);
if the law of the place of injury were applied (column 3); and if
the law of the forum were applied either on the theory that survival is a procedural matter or on the theory that it is a matter
relating to the local administration of the decedent's estate (column 4). In addition, column 5 indicates, so far as possible, the
result which seems clearly desirable on the basis of the foregoing
discussion.
TABLE 7
Factors

Law Applied and Result
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Interest
Interest
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C*
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Of the false-problem cases, three arise in California courts
(Cases 2, 4, and 12), and one (Case 14) in Arizona. The simple
application of the law of the forum (indicated by the language of
the Grant case) would lead to the desirable result in all but one
of these (Case 12). If the assumptions on which our analysis has
been based are accepted, Case 12 is one in which California should
apply Arizona law; so also if the domicile of the tort-feasor in the
state is taken as the basis for the application of Arizona policy. But
if the legitimate scope of Arizona policy is limited to property
being administered in the state, this case, like Case io, becomes
one in which the interest of neither state is affected, and in which
California law should be applied. Hence the rationale of the Grant
case (that the law of the forum governs) cannot do any substantial
harm in future cases, so long as it is understood as a principle for
California courts to apply and not as a universal choice-of-law rule
to be applied by other states.
Of the nine cases which present true problems of confficting
interests, three arise in California courts (Cases 3, 6, and 7). The
science of conflict of laws provides, and can provide, no basis on
which the legitimate interest of one state should be preferred to
that of another. In such a situation, the California court should
apply California law, for the reason that when one of two conflicting policies must yield, that of the judges' own state should
prevail-and for the further reason that the parties and the court
should not be saddled with the burden of ascertaining and applying foreign law unless some useful purpose is to be served thereby.
This is emphatically true with respect to the three cases under discussion, since, if the scope of Arizona's policy is limited to the
administration of property in the state, each of these three cases
will present no real problem, and California law should clearly be
applied.
The remaining six problem cases (Cases 5, 8, 9, 1I, 13, and 15)
arise in Arizona courts. It is no part of the function of the Arizona
court to condemn Arizona law for its backwardness, and to apply
a foreign law for the purpose of defeating Arizona policy. No
other basis exists on which that court can rationally prefer California law to that of Arizona °8 Although I deplore the results
108. This assumes that the formulation of Arizona policy which we have used as
a basis for discussion is the accepted one. A rational basis for the Arizona court's applying
California law could be found if the Arizona policy were more narrowly interpreted.
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which application of that benighted law would produce, I can
reach no other conclusion than that Arizona should, in each of
these cases, apply its own law." 9
The case in Group 5 (Case io) presents no conflict of interests.
It does pose a very real problem of disposition. Whether it is to
be regarded as a true problem of conflict of laws or not seems a
formal and unimportant question, so long as we recognize what
the problem is and what it is not. As I have said, I think the sensible disposition is for the California court to apply California law.
The suggestion that either forum in any of the possible cases
might reasonably apply its own law suggests opportunities for
forum-shopping-a tactic which is rather generally condemned
in the literature of conflict of laws, though not quite so generally
in the cases.11 Just as the ideal of uniformity is given too high a
priority and is too generally stated, so may forum-shopping be too
bitterly and too broadly condemned. The two are nearly correlative: uniformity is desired largely to prevent forum-shopping; and,
if the demand for uniformity is subject to moderation, so must be
the distaste for forum-shopping. At any rate, let us examine the
opportunities for forum-shopping which are afforded by the approach which has been suggested.
In its plainest meaning, forum-shopping presupposes a plaintiff-one who has the initiative-and at least two forums in which
he can bring his action. The plaintiff in our situation will wish to
avoid the Arizona court, in which he must always lose. His opportunities to do so are limited. In half of the cases, Arizona is the
domicile of the decedent, and may be the only state in which there
are assets making administration and suit possible.1 1 Let us assume, however, that assets of the decedent are being administered
in both states. By electing to bring his action in California rather
than in Arizona, the plaintiff will win in every case except Case 12
109. From California's point of view, this over-all result in the problem cases would
be more unfavorable than that produced by the rule that the law of the place of injury
governs, since, under that rule, Arizona would (if California's hopes were fulfilled) apply
California law in four of the six cases. The fact that, under the suggested approach, California policy would suffer in all six cases is not California's doing; California cannot, by
legislation or otherwise, control the result in the Arizona courts. California policy suffers
because Arizona law is different. But California's adoption of the rule that the law of
the place of injury should prevail as a universal guide to choice of law is a positive invitation to the Arizona courts to frustrate California policy in two of the problem cases.
110. Curry v. States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
111. The plaintiff's opportunities are increased if the deceased's insurance carrier is
amenable to process in California, see Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105
(1938); but, as we have noted, where the insurer is the real defendant the basis for applying the policy of abatement should disappear.
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-and will win even in that case if the court, taking a less expansive
view of the scope of Arizona policy than we have done, regards
Arizona's interest as limited to property administered in the state.
But a major reason why he will win is that, instead of bringing the
action in such a way as to create a conflict of interests between states,
he brings it in such a way that there is no such conflict, and no problem; the case can be decided in his favor with justice to the parties
and without impairment of the interest of any state." 2 It may be
said that the suggested approach offers an inducement to plaintiffs to choose their forums in such a way as to minimize true conflicts, and so avoid the necessity of one state's striking down the
interest of another. Such forum-shopping seems positively commendable. I -am not quite sure how seriously I mean this; I do
think the argument suggests that we need to take a harder and
closer look at the ideal of uniformity and the condemnation of
forum-shopping.
There remains the stubborn fact that under any conceivable
conflict-of-laws method the interests of one state will be sacrificed
to those of another whenever there is conflict. The only virtue of
the method proposed here is that it at least makes the choice of
interests on a rational and objective basis: the forum consistently
applies its own law in case of conflict, and thus at least advances
its domestic policy. This is not an ideal; it is simply the best that
is available. I have pointed out elsewhere, as Cook pointed out as
long ago as igig," that in the United States we have available an

effective means of resolving the conflicts which cannot be resolved
112. This is flatly true if we assume that Arizona's interest is limited to property administered in the state. In that event, every case which in the Arizona court would present
a conflict of interests is transmuted into a false-problem case if the action is brought in
California. On the assumption employed in the text, which concedes Arizona two bases
for an interest in applying its policy, the results of the plaintiff's election to sue in California instead of Arizona are as follows: Case 14 becomes Case 10; Case 5 becomes Case
1; Case 8 becomes Case 4; Case 9 becomes Case 2; Case 11 becomes Case 3; Case 13 becomes Case 6; Case 15 becomes Case 7; and Case 16 becomes Case 12. Thus the pairs
5-1, 8-4, and 9-2 represent the elimination of conflicts by forum-shopping. The pairs 11-3,
13-6, and 15-7 pose the question whether California is prepared to sacrifice its governmental
interest in order to make forum-shopping unprofitable.
Forum-shopping may also refer to the tactics of a defendant who maneuvers in such
a way as to force trial in a forum favorable to him. It is difficult to see how the estate
could avoid suit in California in Cases 2, 4, and 10, where California is the domicile of
the tort-feasor. In the other four cases (Cases 3, 6, 7, and 12) suit in California might,
perhaps, be avoided by the withdrawal of all assets from the state before the appointment
of an ancillary administrator. See Potter v. First Nat'l Bank, 107 NJ. Eq. 72, 151 Ad.
546 (1930). Thus Case 3 would become Case 11, Case 6 would become Case 13, Case 7
would become Case 15, and Case 12 would become Case 16.
113. Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE
L.J. 421 (1919).
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by conflict-of-laws methods: legislation by Congress under the
authority of the second sentence of the full faith and credit clause."
I see no reason why federal powers should not be brought to bear
to solve this problem, if it is important enough to warrant the time
which the California courts and the Law Revision Commission
have devoted to it. Long disuse of those powers, however, discourages the hope that they may be soon revived for this particular
problem. We may turn then, in conclusion, to the question of
what the state legislatures can do about the matter.
First of all, the California Legislature can follow the good advice of the Law Revision Commission, and refrain from enacting
a rule requiring the courts of California to apply the law of the
place of injury as to survival or abatement.
Second, the California Legislature, and all others, would do
well to avoid enacting choice-of-law rules in general. This is intended as a very narrow statement. It does not mean that legislatures should not concern themselves with problems of conflict of
laws. There is a body of highly desirable legislation in the field.
The statement means only that the legislature would be well advised not to express its will concerning conflict-of-laws problems in
the form of traditional choice-of-law rules, such as that the survival
of a cause of action for personal injuries is a matter of substantive
law, to be determined by the law of the place of injury. There is
a substantial body of opinion opposing the codification, constitutionalization, or even restatement of conflict-of-laws rules on the
ground that, in the present state of development, any crystallization would be premature."5 The objection cannot be met, as is
sometimes supposed, by devising narrower and more specific
choice-of-law rules." 6 The whole idea of the choice-of-law rule
itself is suspect.
The choice-of-law rule is an odd creature among laws. It never
tells what the result will be, but only where to look to find the re114. Currie, supra note 106. See also Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLU.m. L. REv. 1, 21 (1945), A.A.L.S. RIFAWNGS at 244.
115. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical PerspectiveShould the Restatement be "Continued"?, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 133 (1954); Freund, Chief
Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HAuv. L. REv. 1210, 1236 (1946); Rheinstein,
Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CoNraM. PROB. 114, 131
(1951).
116. 1 RABEL, Tim CoNFLc-v op LAws: A COMpARATIVE Stuny 92 (1945); Cheatham,
American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HAnv. L. REv. 361
(1945), A.A.L.S. READiNGs 48; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, A.A.L.S. READINGs 71 (1924); Neuner, Policy Considerationsin
the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAx. B. REv. 479 (1942); Rheinstein, supra note 115, at 1830-31.
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sult; and the author of the rule cannot foresee the outcome. Such
rules are made by theorists in an effort to impose an external order
upon the states; they do not come naturally from legislatures,
which are interested in forseeable results. Whatever virtue such
rules may have lies in their tendency to foster uniformity of result
from state to state; but, even if a legislature should be convinced
that this is the highest goal of conflict of laws, it cannot enact the
ideal into reality, because the legislature cannot control the decisions of courts of other states. For purposes of uniformity, a choiceof-law rule is worthless unless other states which may be concerned
will voluntarily adhere to it. To the extent that such a rule enacted
by the California Legislature asserts that California law should be
controlling in certain cases, it need not necessarily be respected by
other states; to the extent that it disclaims the applicability of California law, it provides an excuse for other courts to apply a different
law. Even if the enactment by California of the rule of the Restatement on survival were to spur other states to adopt the same rule,
the mandate would be a strange one in the mouth of the California
Legislature: it would command California courts to frustrate the
sovereign interests of California in two of the fourteen possible
cases (in one of them without any contribution to the interests of
any foreign state), and would cordially invite other states to do the
same in two additional cases.
There is a contribution which legislatures can make to progress
in this troubled field. They can cultivate the practice of adding to
specific enactments a section specifying the extent to which the law
is intended to apply to cases involving foreign factors. Thus California might reasonably specify that its law on the survival of personal injury actions is intended to apply to all cases in which the
injured person is a resident of California, and also to all cases in
which the injured person, though a nonresident, is present in California at the time of the injury. The Arizona legislature, if such
should be its will, could specify that its law abating such actions is
intended to apply to all cases in which the action is brought against
a local executor or administrator, or to all cases in which the deceased tort-feasor was domiciled there, or both. The value of such
directions would be tremendous-provided, of course, that they
were drafted with careful regard to the moderate and legitimate
interests of the state, and not with an overweening desire to impose
the doubtful wisdom of the enacting state upon the rest of the
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world. These would not be choice-of-law rules, in the sense of universals assigning "jurisdiction" to the only competent state. They
would simply be exercises of the lawmaking power, directed to
local courts, providing aids to statutory construction. Their great
value would lie in the fact that they would make explicit the policy expressed in the statute, and the mode of application which will
promote that policy." ' This is the great need of the courts. Without such guidance, they are compelled to choose between constructs
of legislative policy which are often speculative, on the one hand,
and the interest-wrecking mechanics of the system on the other.
Since traditional judicial techniques do not emphasize nor systematize the ascertainment and implementation of policy, it is
understandable that the courts have commonly shied away from
the first alternative. If legislatures were to state their policies explicitly, in such a way as to reveal the significant factors which
should bring those policies into play, the remaining task of the
courts-to apply the law so as to effectuate that policy where no
constitutional barrier is presented, and to avoid applying it needlessly to the impairment of interests of other states-would be a
comparatively simple one. The formulation of such legislative
guides is not easy. It must be done on a case-by-case basis, with
great care and discrimination and moderation. But it is worth
doing. Here is a richly constructive activity and a challenge for
law revision commissions. If the job is not done in the statute, the
problem of ascertaining the policy and the mode of effectuating it
is left to the courts, imposing on them the too familiar task of
making bricks without straw. The most conscientious and perceptive courts, like the California Supreme Court in the Grant
case, will do their best to ascertain the policy and further it. Others,
in bewilderment and frustration, will fall back on the machine.
117. It is not unreasonable to expect that this sort of legislative attention to conflictof-laws problems might lead to the abandonment of obsolete domestic laws. Thus if we
try to visualize how the Arizona legislature might approach a formulation of the policy
embodied in its abatement rule, we can imagine that the legislature might be disposed to
relax its policy of protecting locally administered property in certain situations--as, for
example, where the injured person is a resident of a state having a compensatory policy,
and where the decedent was domiciled in the same foreign state. Each such concession
would provide additional ground for questioning the wisdom of retaining the rule for
purely domestic cases. Recognition that local policy is relatively weak, and perhaps should
not be extended to eases involving significant foreign factors, may force recognition of the
undesirability of the policy even for home consumption.
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APPENDIX
Tm

P

cEDENTs*

The following enumeration is confined to the cases cited in Grant v.
McAuliffe, in Mr. Sumner's study, and in the law review comments on the
decision. The only cases included are those dealing with the question whether
a cause of action for personal injuries (or death) survives the alleged tortfeasor, since different policy considerations are suggested both by other torts
and by the question whether the cause of action survives the injured party.
tangentially with survival of the alleged tortIn addition, cases dealing only
18
feasor have been excluded.'
Cases in which the action was commenced before the death of the tortfeasor are included, since I can find no satisfactory ground for distinguishing
between revival and survival in this context. 19
On this basis, there are twenty-five relevant cases. These may, with a
fair degree of accuracy, be classified according to the groups shown in Table
6.120 Precise classification is not always possible, since the reports sometimes
do not give the necessary information. In some instances, missing information has been discovered from sources outside the reports. Since the sources
of such information are of merely collateral interest, documentation is
omitted in the interest of brevity.
Our classification assumes only two different laws: complete survival or
complete abatement. One case cannot be fitted into that classification because
it involves a third type of law: partial survival. This is Wallan v. Rankin,
173 F.2d 488 ( 9th Cir. 1949). The court treated the law of the place of
injury (Oregon), allowing complete survival, as applicable, finding in the
fact that California allowed partial survival an indication that recovery was
not opposed to the public policy of the forum. The analysis in the text would
lead to the conclusion that recovery should be limited as provided by California law.
One case must be classified as belonging to Group II, in which application of the law of the place of injury advances the interest of the foreign
state, which adheres to the rule of abatement, without detriment to any
interest of the forum state, which provides for survival. The case is Potter
v. FirstNationalBank, 107 N.J. Eq. 72, 151 At. 546 (i93o). Actually, this
was a companion case to Matter of Killough, discussed at page 251 infra, so

that we know that the law of the place of injury provided for survival. In
that light, this would be classified as similar to Case 6, Group III. However,
I am indebted to Miss Anne von der Lieth, of the Class of 1958, Stanford University

Law School, for assistance in the compilation of this Appendix.

118. In McIntosh v. General Chemical Defense Corp., 67 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.W. Va.
1946), the issue was which of two statutes of limitation at the forum was applicable. In
Hellrung v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., 102 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1951), an issue was
whether the jurisdictional amount was in controversy.
119. See Shavelson, Survival of Tort Actions in the Conflict of Laws, 42 CA.,F. L
Rxv, 803, 807-8 (1954); Note, 68 HAtav. L. Rav. 1260 n.4 (1955).
120. P. 234 supra.
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the law of the place of injury did not appear, and the court presumed that
the common-law rule of abatement was in force there.
The bulk of the cases-sixteen of them-fall into Group III. In this
group there is a real conflict of interests, in terms of the analysis in the text.
In the following cases, the court applied the law of the place of injury, thus
advancing the interest of the foreign state at the expense of the interest of the
forum:
Minnesota
Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314 (931)21
(Kertson v. Johnson, x85 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329, 85 A.L.R. i
[1932])122

In re Estate of Daniel, 208 Minn.

420, 294

N.W. 465

(1940)123

Missouri
Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W-2d 96 (933)121

New York
Domres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 63o, 26o N.Y. Supp. 335 (4 th
Dept. 1932)125

Tennessee
Parsonsv. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d
698 (1934)126

On the other hand, in the following cases the court avoided application
of the law of the place of injury on one ground or another, thus preferring
local to foreign interests:
Colorado
Gray v. Blight, I12 F.2d 696 (Ioth Cir. 1940) (law of forum controls
as to remedy; forum has public policy against recovery)
District of Columbia
Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (though law of
place of injury governs survival, law of forum prohibits suit against
estate for personal injury)
121. The authority of the case has not been, and probably should not be, impaired
because of the fact that on rehearing it was found that the foreign statute relied on by the
plaintiff was not a survival statute. 182 Minn. at 231, 234 N.W. at 868. It may be significant, however, that the court left open the question whether a judgment for the plaintiff
would be on a par with other claims against the estate. Id. at 230, 234 N.W. at 316.
122. Since it clearly appears that the defendant was insured, this case may have
actually involved no detriment to any interest of the forum.
123. Application of the law of the place of injury with respect to survival has a
special charm here, since the court refused to apply the statute of limitations of the place
of injury, according to which the action was barred.
124. While the forum had no survival statute, it did have a revival statute. Understandably, the court felt that the forum's policy against holding the estate responsible
could not be very strong.
125. Implicitly overruled by Herzog v. Stem, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934).
126. Again the forum had a revival statute.
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New York
Clough v.Gardiner, iII Misc. 244, 182 N.Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct.
192o) (public policy of the forum)
Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73,2z65 N.Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933)
(procedural: matter of administration of estates; analogy to statute
of limitations; local public policy)
Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, i9i N.E. 23, cert. denied, 293 U.S.
597 (1934) (local policy; matter of administration of estates)
Dougherty v. Gutenstein, ioF. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (local
public policy)
Silverman v. Rappaport, 165 Misc. 543, 300 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct.
1937) (on authority of Herzog v. Stern)
Demuth v. Griffin, 253 App. Div. 39 9, 2 N.Y.S.2d 2 (iSt Dept. z938)
(on authority of Herzog v. Stern)
Washington
Muir v. Kessinger,35 F. Supp. 116 (ED. Wash. X940) (local law on
administration of estates controlling)
None of the six decisions applying the law of the place of injury seems
to do so mechanically. The courts, understandably, were unable to see in
the retention of the rule of abatement any clear policy of the forum--especially where the forum had a revival statute. Plainly, these courts deplored
the archaism of their own laws and sought the just result in the progressive
foreign law.127 The pity is that a court so disposed does not abrogate the
archaic rule for all purposes, instead of seeking limited escape through the
loose apparatus of conflict of laws. That it did not do so in the key case of
Chubbuck v. Holloway, x82 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314 (931), may be attributable to the unfortunate fact that Minnesota had enacted the commonlaw rule by statute. Abrogation for conflicts purposes alone tends to discriminate in favor of nonresidents. As the New York court observed: "A rule
that would permit the depletion of the estate of a deceased resident through
enforcement of claims for damages for personal injuries sustained outside
of the State, where the Legislature has denied such remedy for injuries within
the State, seems . .. unreasonable ... :,121
In re Vilas" Estate, 166 Ore. i 5, IIo P.ad 940 (1941), also belongs to
Group III (Case 6 [A A C C]). Here the law of the place of injury and the
law of the forum both provide for survival, and the application of that law
advances the interest of the forum at the expense of the foreign interest. That
was the result reached by the court, but it is not clear whether the rationale
was that the law of the place of injury governed, or that survival is a question
of remedy. Since it appears that the tort-feasor was insured, there may actually have been no impairment of any interest of the foreign state.
127. See Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 338, 67 S.W.2d 96, 100 (1933), referring to the
"erosion" of a statute said to declare the common-law rule.
128. Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 384, 191 N.E. 23, 25, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597
(1934).
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At least two, and perhaps three, of the cases must be classified in Group
V, where application of the law of the place of injury (or of the law of the
forum) affects the interests of neither state. In all cases, the law of the place
of injury was applied:
Maine
Dalton v. McLean, 137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940).
New Jersey
(Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, 112 NJ.L. 546, i71 Ad. 835 [Ct. Err.
& App. 1934])12
Pennsylvania
Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 92 A.L.R. 1499 (1933)
In all these cases, of course, the law of the place of injury dictated abatement, and recovery was denied. The application of the rule seems purely
mechanical, and the "illiberal" results are to be contrasted with the "liberal"
results achieved by application of the law of the place of injury in the cases
falling in Group III.
At least two, and perhaps five, of the cases fall into Group VI. Here
application of the law of the place of injury frustrates the interests of the
forum state with no advancement of any foreign interest; the cases are similar to Grant v. McAuliffe. In all five cases, the law of the place of injury was
applied to deny recovery:
Connecticut
(Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Ad. 691 [1928] )"80

Michigan
Yount v. NationalBank, 327 Mich. 342, 42 N.W.2d 110 (1950)
New Jersey
Friedman v. Greenberg,IIo N.J.L. 462, 166 Ad. ii9, 87 A.L.R. 849
(Ct. Err. & App. 1933)131
(Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, 112 N.J.L. 546, 171 Ad. 835 [Ct. Err.
& App. 19341)12
Pennsylvania
(Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. St. 124, 167 Ad. 315 [i933] )13
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Grant v. McAuliffe
was, indeed, unorthodox; the cases exactly in point are to the contrary. But
the question is whether the court is to be condemned for preferring rationality to orthodoxy.
129. Perhaps this should be in Group VI.
130. Possibly this should be classified as Case 7 (C A A C) (Group IV), advancing
the interest of the foreign state at the expense of that of the forum.
131. Professor Herbert R. Baer, of the University of North Carolina, of counsel for
defendant, informs me that there was adequate liability insurance in this case.
132. See note 130 supra.
133. Possibly this should be classified as Case 10 (A C A C) (Group V), where
neither interest is affected.
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